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CHAPTER 10 
Environmental Law 
PETER L. KOFF* 
LAURIE BURT** 
CATHERINE L. FARRELL ***t 
§ 10.1. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council. During the Survey 
year, the new Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council (the "Coun-
cil"), together with the Department of Environmental Management 
("DEM"), adopted regulations! to implement and administer the Hazard-
ous Waste Facility Siting Act, chapter 21Dofthe General Laws. The Siting 
Act was enacted in 19802 in response to the conspicuous absence of any 
modern hazardous waste facilities in the Commonwealth and the very 
urgent need for such facilities in this industrial state. The lack of new 
facilities is attributable in large part to often insurmountable institutional 
barriers to siting such a facility in any given community. 3 It is almost 
axiomatic that while the public recognizes the need for safe and properly 
maintained hazardous waste facilities, no one wants one in his own back-
yard. 4 
* PETER L. KOFF is a partner in the Boston law firm of Koff and Lawson. 
** LAURIE BURT is an associate in the Boston law firm of Foley, Hoag & Eliot. 
*** CATHERINE L. FARRELL is Assistant Counsel, Filene's of Boston. 
t The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Carl F. Dierker, Deputy General 
Counsel of the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering, and Arnold 
L. Lum, former Counsel to the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facilities Site Safety Council 
and presently a member of the Massachusetts bar. 
§ 10.1. 1 "Regulations for the Administration of the Hazardous Waste Facility Siting 
Act, G.L. c. 2ID," MASS. ADM!N. CODE tit. 990, §§ 1 et seq (effective April 29, 1982). 
Proposed regulations in the form of a public hearing draft were issued jointly by the Council 
and DEM in January 1982. 
2 G.L. c. 2ID was added by Acts of 1980, c. 508, § 8 (effective July 15, 1980), and 
represents the culmination of an exhaustive investigation by the Special Committee on 
Hazardous Waste of legislative alternatives to deal with impediments (legal, economic and 
otherwise) to the siting process. See Acts of 1979, c. 704, § 4. 
3 See Bacow and Milkey, Overcoming Local Oppositon to Hazardous Waste Facilities: The 
Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 265 (1982). 
4 [d. at 267-269. Bacow and Milkey analyze "local opposition to hazardous waste disposal 
facilities in terms of perceived long-term health and environmental risks and social and 
economic costs, such as noise, congestion, depression of real estate values, and the stigma of 
being known as the "region's dump." 
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Chapter 21D attempts to reconcile these conflicting statewide and local 
interests through an innovative process of promotion, negotiations and full 
disclosure. First, DEM is the "promoter," charged under the Siting Act 
with the responsibility for soliciting new facility proposals, identifying 
environmentally acceptable sites for development and acting as an infor-
mation clearing-house on new technologies for the treatment, processing, 
and disposal of hazardous wastes.s The Department of Environmental 
Quality Engineering ("DEQE") retains its traditional role as the principal 
licensing agency in the siting process. DEQE sets the substantive perfor-
mance standards and financial responsibility criteria for site developers and 
facility operators. 6 
The Council was established to be the moderator of the entire siting 
process, and is specially charged under the Siting Act to facilitate a work-
able Siting Agreement between the developer and host communities. In-
deed, the touchstone of the Siting Act is the fundamental premise and 
requirement that the developer and the host community can and must work 
together to mitigate anticipated adverse impacts caused by siting a new 
hazardous waste facility. The Act creates an incentive for both sides to 
resolve their differences. On the one hand, the statute restricts local 
authority to exclude facilities altogether, while on the other, it requires a 
developer to compensate a host community for the social and economic 
impacts associated with having a new facility. Specifically, the developer 
has the right under the statute to site a facility in an area zoned for 
industrial use if it completes a Siting Agreement, by negotiation or 
through arbitration, with the host community. 7 In exchange, the host 
community is given technical assistance, through grants, to enable it to 
have more meaningful input in the siting process, and is provided a 
comprehensive compensation package from the developer, including, 
inter alia, direct monetary payments and other beneficial services.s 
The regulations adopted during the Survey year implement the pro-
cedural steps established by chapter 21D for review of a siting proposal 
S G.L. c. 210, § 3. 
6 G.V. c. 21C, § 7, as amended by Acts of 1980, c. 508, §§ 2, 3. The 1980 amendments 
changed the standard by which DEQE may grant a license to construct, maintain and operate 
a hazardous waste facility, and further limited waste disposal by landfill to the alternative of 
last resort. 
7 Acts of 1980, c. 508, § 5 amended the Zoning Enabling Act, G.L., c. 40A, § 9, to permit 
construction of a hazardous waste facility, as of right, in any area zoned for industrial use 
provided that the developer obtains all necessary permits and licenses and successfullv 
completes a Siting Agreement under G.L. c. 21D, §§ 12, 13. Once a developer files a Notice of 
Intent to construct a facility pursuant to the Siting Act, the host community may not adopt any 
zoning change to exclude the facility. This prohibition against exclusionary zoning, however, 
is lifted following final disapproval of the facility and expiration of all appeal periods under 
chapter 210. See G.L. c. 210, § 16. 
8 G.L. c. 210, §§ II, 12. 
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and creation of a Siting Agreement. The first step in this process is the 
filing of a Notice of Intent, the purpose of which is to inform the public of 
a facility proposal and to provide the Council with preliminary informa-
tion necessary for it to determine if the project is "feasible and deserving 
of state assistance," and therefore warranting further state review. 9 The 
regulations specify the contents of a Notice of Intent and require it to 
include a description of the proposed facility, the type of technology to be 
used, the developer's prior experience and financial responsibility data, 
and identification of the selected site(s) for development. lo The devel-
oper, however, need not identify a particular site at the Notice of Intent 
stage, but he must indicate his willingness or unwillingness to utilize the 
site selection process provided in the statute. I I Copies of the Notice of 
Intent must be sent to all host communities in which one or more sites are 
identified. 
The Siting Act provides that the Council must determine whether the 
project is feasible and deserving within fifteen days of receipt of a com-
pleted Notice ofIntent. 12 The very short review period indicates that this 
initial siting decision represents only a preliminary judgment on the merits 
of a facility proposal before permitting a project to proceed through the 
exhaustive impact analysis and licensing procedures set forth in chapter 
21D. This review is intended to be a rough screening to eliminate projects 
which are clearly infeasible or developers who are financially insecure. 
While acknowledging the limited purpose of this feasible and deserving 
determination, the new regulations create a far more extensive review of a 
Notice of Intent than the fifteen day statutory review period by providing 
a forty-five day public comment period before a Notice of Intent is 
considered complete. \3 The regulations thus provide an opportunity for 
public comment and input in the Council's threshold determination on a 
project which was not expressly contemplated by the Siting Act. 
While the Siting Act is silent as to the meaning of "feasible and 
deserving, " the regulations establish fairly stringent threshold criteria for 
9 [d. at § 7; MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 4.00. 
10 G.L. c. 210, § 7; MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 4.02. 
II G.L. c. 210, § 9; MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 4.03. The site selection process, 
administered by OEM, is quite complex and involves solicitation of site suggestions from 
certain designated parties, public briefing sessions, a public comment period, and promulga-
tion of a final list of acceptable sites. The Council then reduces this list to three candidate sites, 
including the developer's preferred site, ifany. See G.L. c. 210, § 9; MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
990, § 7.00. 
12 G.L. c. 210, § 7. 
13 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, §§ 4.05, 5.02. By creating a 45 day public comment period, 
the regulations assure that the host community will have formed its Local Assessment 
Committee ("LAC") and have an opportunity to comment on a project proposal before the 
Council renders its feasible and deserving determination. See G.L. c. 210, § 5 (LAC must be 
established within 30 days of receipt of Notice of Intent). 
3
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the Council's initial determination, focusing on the need for the facility, 
the financial resources and credibility of the developer, and significantly, 
certain site specific criteria which prohibit site development in environ-
mentally sensitive or protected natural resource areas. 14 If the developer 
has not named specific sites in its Notice of Intent, the Council may still 
issue a feasible and deserving determination on the non-site aspects of the 
Notice. 15 If the developer utilizes the site selection proces s, the Council 
must defer its determination on the acceptability of specific sites until the 
conclusion of that review process. 16 
A favorable feasible and deserving determination by the Council trig-
gers the more formal impact review process and negotiations between the 
developer and host and abutting communities. The host community's 
participation and representation in this process must be exclusively 
through its Local Assessment Committee ("LAC") which must be 
formed within thirty days from receipt of a Notice of Intent to build a 
14 Compare O.L. c. 2ID, § 7 with MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit 990, § 5.00. The regulations 
exclude from site development, inter alia, any area protected by the Wetlands Protection Act, 
O.L. c. 131, § 40 and the regulations promulgated thereunder, MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 310, 
§§ 9.00-10.00; scenic rivers; Areas of Critical Environmental Concern; national and state 
parks; watersheds of Class A surface waters; and drinking water supplies or aquifers. MASS. 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 5.04(1)-(9). There is some question whether the Council has the 
statutory authority to impose such substantive criteria on site selection, a function which 
appears is othelWise delegated to DEQE under O.L. c. 21C, § 7. The Siting Act, however, 
does authorize the Council to reject proposals which it finds to be unacceptable for the siting 
process "after appropriate consultation with [DEQE]." O.L. c. 21P, § 4(8). It would 
therefore appear that the Council's threshold siting criteria would be valid, at least to the 
extent said criteria are not inconsistent with DEQE's substantive siting criteria. 
15 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 5.03. 
16 !d. at § 5.04. A developer may move for reconsideration of a negative feasible and 
deserving determination at any time. Id. at § 5.06(1). Alternatively, a developer may seek 
judicial review of such determination pursuant to O.L. c. 30A, § 14 as the Council's determi-
nation is a final agency decision and Chapter 21D does not expressly preclude such review. 
See O.L. c. 30A, § 7. In contrast, other interested persons may seek reconsideration of a 
favorable feasible and de~erving determination only where the developer has utilized the site 
selection process. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990. § 5.06(2). Such persons, however, may not 
seek immediate judicial review of a favorable determination, since such a decision is just the 
first in a number of administrative steps before a final decision on a site location will be made 
under chapter 21D. See Boston Edison v. Brookline Realty & Investment Corp., 10 Mass. 
App. Ct. 63, 405 N.E.2d 995 (1980); East Chop Tennis Club v. Mass. Comm'r Against 
Discrimination, 364 Mass. 444, 305 N.E.2d 507 (1973). Early judicial review of a feasible and 
deserving determination is one of the key issues to be decided by the Supreme Judicial Court 
in the pending matter of Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, et aI., No. 
3221 (S.J.C.). In Warren, the superior court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the town's 
appeal of the Council's favorable initial determination because the town "failed to exhaust 
its administrative remedies as it [had] only proceeded through the initial stage of the site 
proposal process required by O.L. c. 2ID." Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety 
Council, No. 82-21740, slip op. at 5 (Worcester Sup. Ct., January II, 1983). 
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facility in a named city or town, or from notification by DEM that the city 
or town is a host. community of a site appearing on the final list of 
suggested sites. 17 The LAC is responsible under the statute for represent-
ing the host community in all negotiations with the developer regarding 
the terms and conditions of the Siting Agreement and for appointing two 
local residents to participate as voting members of the Council with 
respect to the facility proposal.I 8 Once formed, the LAC is eligible to 
receive technical assistance grants from the CounciJ19 including the costs 
of staff, consultants, engineers, lawyers and other expenses. 20 
Full public disclosure about the details of a facility proposal is man-
dated by the Siting Act. Within thirty days of the Council's determination 
that a proposal is feasible and deserving, or the publication of a final 
suggested site list, DEM must conduct at least one briefing session in the 
host community or in each host community on the final list. 21 All deci-
sions of the Council and filings by the developer must be published in the 
Environmental Monitor or by other appropriate means. 22 
Upon selection of one or more sites by the developer or the Council 
through the site selection process, the developer must prepare a prelimi-
nary and final impact report for each site under consideration. 23 The 
impact review process under the Siting Act tracks almost identically the 
review procedures under the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act 
17 G.L. c. 21D, § 5; MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 8.01. The chief executive officer of a 
community must appoint the members of the LAC, which by statute must include the chief 
executive officer who serves as chairman, the chairman of the board of health, the chairman of 
the planning board, the chairman of the conservation commission, the fire chief, and four 
local residents nominated by the chief executive officer and approved by the local governing 
body. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 8.02. In the event that the chief executive officer fails to 
form a LAC, the Council must appoint the members of the committee itself. G.L. c. 21C, § 5; 
MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 8.03. 
18 G.L. c. 21D, §§ 4, 5(2); MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 8.06. The LAC is also subject to 
the requirements of the Open Meeting Law, G.L. c. 39, §§ 23A-23D, although the purposes for 
which the LAC may hold executive sessions are expanded to include strategy discussions and 
negotiations with respect to the Siting Agreement. 
19 G.L. c. 21D, § II; MAss. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 9.00. Abutting communities as well as 
the LAC are eligible for grant assistance. While the statute appears to condition the award of 
such grants upon the scoping of the environmental impact part of the preliminary project 
impact report, the regulations make it clear that advance funding of up to $5,000 may be 
awarded to eligible communities before that time. Compare G.L. c. 21D, § 11 with MASS. 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, §§ 9.01, 9.04(2). 
20 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 9.04. The Council may grant up to a maximum of$15,000 
per grant, although recipient communities may request additional grants. [d. at 9.06. 
21 G.L. c. 21D, § 8; MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 6.03. 
22 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, §§ 4.05, 5.05, 6.03, 7.04, 7.05,10.01(3),10.02(4),10.03(3), 
and 15.02. 
23 G.L. c. 2lD, § 10; MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 10.00. 
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("MEPA") and the MEPA regulationsY The one significant addition 
under chapter 21D is that the developer must prepare a detailed socio-
economic analysis, called the Socio-Economic Appendix ("SEA"), ad-
dressing the positive and negative impacts of the proposed project and 
feasible measures to minimize any adverse socio-economic impacts.25 
The developer must also prepare the traditional environmental impact 
report which continues to be reviewed by the Secretary of Environmental 
Affairs, in tandem with the Council's review of the SEA.26 The Final 
Project Impact Report is prepared only after execution of the Siting 
Agreement, and must include information, comments and facility redesign 
data resulting from negotiation of the agreement. 27 The Council and the 
Secretary then determine the adequacy of the Final Project Impact Re-
port. 28 
The Siting Agreement, of course, is the culminating feature ofthe entire 
siting process. No facility may be constructed without a Siting Agreement 
established between the developer and the LAC, and until the agreement 
has been declared by the Council to be operative and in full force and 
effect. 29 Upon such Council approval, the Siting Agreement becomes a 
nonassignable contract binding the developer and the host community, 
and is enforceable against either party in court.30 The elements of a Siting 
Agreement, as specified in the Siting Act and repeated in the new regula-
tions, include, inter alia, procedures for facility construction, operation 
and maintenance; monitoring practices; compensation; services and spe-
cial benefits to the host community; services and benefits to be provided 
by the Commonwealth; tax provisions, including prepayments or pay-
ments in lieu of taxes; renegotiation provisions; and compensation for 
abutting communities. 31 The statute also provides for certain optional 
24 G.L. c. 30, §§ 62-62H; MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 301, § 10.00. The Council's regulations, 
like the MEPA regulations, require the developer to first file a Project Notification Form 
("PNF"), which is then "scoped" and the contents of the impact report determined, followed 
by preparation and review of preliminary and final Project Impact Reports. MASS. ADMIN. 
CODE tit. 990, §§ 10.01-10.03. Public comment periods are provided at each review stage of 
the report. [d. 
B G.L. c. 2lD, § 10; MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 10.01(5). The SEA serves as a key 
document in the negotiation of a Siting Agreement by the developer and host community. 
26 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, §§ 10.01-10.03. 
27 [d. at § 10.03(2). 
28 [d. at § 10.03; MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 301, § 10.07(4). This determination is a 
precondition of the Council's final declaration that the siting agreement is operative and to be 
given full force and etl'ect. G.L. c. 21D, § 12; MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 14.03. 
29 G.L. c. 2lD, § 12; MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, §§ 14.02, 14.03. 
30 See supra note 29. 
31 G.L. c. 2lD, § 12, cl. 2(1)-(10); MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 14.01(1). The level of 
compensation to be provided by the developer to abutting communities must be established by 
the Council. G.L. c. 2lD, § 14. Abutting communities, unlike the host community, are entitled 
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elements of an agreement, including direct monetary payments for "de-
monstrable adverse impacts. "32 
Negotiations of the Siting Agreement can commence at any time after 
the Council determines a project is feasible and deserving of state assis-
tance, or after a site is identified through the site selection process.33 The 
parties may voluntarily accept the services of a mediator, or the Council in 
its discretion may require the parties to utilize a mediator if there is not 
sufficient progress in the negotiations. 34 If no agreement is reached after 
the Council's approval of the draft SEA, the Council may declare an 
impasse and require the parties to submit to final and binding arbitra-
tion. 35 Once appointed, the arbitrator, or arbitration panel as the case may 
be, must determine, after a hearing, the terms and conditions ofthe Siting 
Agreement within forty-five days.36 The Siting Act and, in tum, the new 
regulations, provide that the arbitration proceedings are governed by the 
procedures and standards for judicial review established by the Uniform 
Arbitration Act for Commercial Disputes.J7 While the Siting Act provides 
that the arbitration will be final and binding, the regulations provide that 
the arbitrator may only submit a final draft agreement to the Council, 
leaving it to the Council to determine whether the agreement complies 
with the procedural and substantive requirements of chapter 21D.38 
to compensation only for "demonstrably adverse impacts." [d. The procedures for establish-
ing such compensations are set forth in the regulations at section 12.00. The Council's 
determination is final unless the developer or abutting community files a request for arbitra-
tion. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 12.06. 
32 G.L. c. 2lD, § 14, cl. 3(1); MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 14.01(2). 
33 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 11.01. Formal negotiations must begin at least upon the 
Council's determination that the draft SEA is adequate. [d. at 11.01(2). 
34 [d. at 11.02. If there is little progress in negotiations 45 days after Council approval of the 
draft SEA, it may require the parties to utilize a mediator selected by the Council. [d. at 
11.02(2). 
35 G.L. c. 21D, § 15, cl. 1. If the parties fail to execute an agreement within 60 days after 
Council approval of the draft SEA, they must submit a Negotiation Status Report identifying 
the unresolved issues and indicating whether an impasse has been reached. MAss. ADMIN. 
CODE tit. 990, § 11.03. The Council may then declare an impasse or extend the period of 
negotiations another 30 days. [d. at 11.04(2). 
36 G.L. c. 2lD, § 15, cl. 4; MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 13.01(2). The 45 day time 
limitation for arbitration may be extended by the Council at the request of the arbitrator. In 
addition, the parties may agree upon a Siting Agreement at any time during the arbitration 
proceedings. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 13.01(3). 
37 G.L. c. 21D, § 15, cl. 6, incorporating by reference G.L. c. 251; MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
990, §§ 13.04-13.05. 
38 Compare G.L. c. 21D, § 15. cl. 5 with MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 14.02. The Siting 
Act does not expressly authorize the Council to pass on the sufficiency of a Siting Agreement, 
but rather empowers it only to declare the agreement to be operative. G.L. c. 21D, § 12, cl. 1; 
see also G.L. c. 21D, § 4. The regulations, however, presume that the Council has the power 
not only to approve but also to reject an agreement, authorizing it to return an agreement, with 
a statement of reasons, to the arbitrator or to the parties for further negotiations. MASS. 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 14.02(3). 
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Although the siting process under chapter 210 is essentially completed 
upon the Council's declaration of an operative Siting Agreement, the 
developer has at least two more siting hurdles to overcome before com-
mencing construction of its facility. First, the developer must obtain a site 
assignment from the local board of health of the host community. 39 The 
ability of a community to abuse this permitting authority is severely 
limited by the statutory standard governing site assignments. A site as-
signment must be granted, after public hearing, if the "proposed facility 
imposes no significantly greater danger . . . than dangers that currently 
exist in the conduct and operations of other industrial and commercial 
enterprises in the Commonwealth not engaged in the treatment, process-
ing or disposal of hazardous waste, but using processes that are compara-
ble.' '40 The host community is further prohibited under the Siting Act 
from imposing any new license or permit requirements after the effective 
date of the statute, and any validly required license or permits must be 
granted within sixty days after application by the developer, or twenty-one 
days after a Siting Agreement is established, whichever is later. 41 Sec-
ond, the developer must obtain from DEQE a license to construct, oper-
ate, and maintain a hazardous waste facility pursuant to chapter 21C of 
the General Laws.42 Unlike the standard for issuance of a local site 
assignment, DEQE's discretion to grant or deny a chapter 2IC license is 
much broader. 43 Regulations governing license requirements and proce-
dures under chapter 2IC were adopted during the Survey year, and 
provide for both informal and, under certain circumstances, formal ad-
judicatory hearings on facility license applications. 44 
39 G.L. c. Ill, § 150B, as amended by Acts of 1980, c. 508, § 4. 
40 /d. A negative determination by the Board of Health is immediately appealable to the 
superior court. A decision granting a site assignment may be appealed by any aggrieved 
persons to DEQE. ld. 
41 G.L. c. 21D, § 16 (effective July 15, 1980); see supra note 7 regarding the prohibition 
against exclusionary zoning under G.L. c. 40A, § 9, as amended by Acts of 1980, c. 508, § 5. 
While curtailing local veto power, the Siting Act falls short of granting the Commonwealth 
unlimited authority to designate new sites for development. A developer who has successfully 
completed the siting process, has a Siting Agreement and all necessary licenses and permits, 
but who cannot in good faith acquire the site, may petition DEM to take the selected site by 
eminent domain. G.L. c. 2iD, § 17; MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 15.00. DEM's authority to 
exercise this power, however, is subject to approval by a majority of the governing body of the 
host community. 
42 See supra note 6. 
43 DEQE must issue a license if it determines that construction, maintenance and operation 
of a facility on a particular site "does not constitute a significant danger to public health, public 
safety, or the environment, do!!s not seriously threaten injury to the inhabitllnts of the area or 
damage to their property, and does not result in the creation of noisome or unwholesome 
odors." G.L. c. 21C, § 7. 
44 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 310, § 30.800 (effective July 1, 1982). An informal public 
hearing must be conducted on all facility license applications. An aggrieved person may 
8
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The new Siting Act makes a laudable attempt to promote the develop-
ment of needed hazardous waste facilities in the Commonwealth while 
compensating host communities which must live with the impacts of such 
facilities within their borders. The siting process encourages informed 
public participation, not through adversary adjudicatory hearings, but 
through negotiations and public comment. It remains to be seen whether 
this incentive approach to siting will be successful. To date, only two 
proposals have progressed beyond the Council's feasible and deserving 
determination.4s 
The promise of compensation may well reduce local opposition to new 
facility d«;:velopment, but is unlikely to eliminate it, particularly in view of 
historical tensions in Massachusetts between state intervention and home 
rule authority. Opponents who cannot stop a project through the siting 
process can resort to other tactics to delay issuance of the site assignm~nt 
permit or the DEQE operating license. The siting process itself, while fair, 
is complex, time-consuming and extremely expensive for the developer. 
Part of the problem is that there are presently no new major facilities in 
any Massachusetts cities or towns to which new host communities can 
look for guidance and experience. The experience of most communities 
which host existing and often poorly managed facilities has been largely 
negative.46 Until more positive experience is gained by communities 
request an adjudicatory hearing within 21 days after DEQE's final license decision. Id. at 
30.837-30.838; see alw MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 301, § 1.00. The Phase II regulations for the 
chapter 21C program, including technical performance and location standards for all types of 
hazardous waste facilities, were not promulgated until October 15, 1983. MASS. ADMIN. CODE 
tit. 310, §§ 30.600, 30.700. 
4S In May 1981, Solv, Inc. submitted a Notice of Intent to construct a hazardous waste 
facility in City of Haverhill. On June 11, 1981, the Council issued a f!ivorable feasible and 
deserving determination for the project. The LAC was then furmed and moved to revoke the 
Council's determination based on new information regarding the proximity of the named site 
to an aquifer system and the financial ability of the developer. The Council voted not to 
reconsider its initial decision and on February 8, 1982, the city and several citizens filed suit 
against the Council. City of Haverhill v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, et 
aI., NQ. 82-683 (Middlesex Sup. Ct.). The superior court dismissed the case without opinion on 
June 7, 1982, and a subsequent appeal by the city was dismissed as moot by the parties when 
the developer agreed to temporarily suspend its proposal from further consideration. 
The second project, proposed by IT Corporation for a facility in the Town of Warren, 
received a favorable initial determination from the Council on December 10, 1982. The town 
sought to overturn the Council's decision and challeged the constitutionality of chapter 21D in 
the superior court, which affirmed the Council's actiops and the statute in every respect. See 
supra note 16. The case is now pending before the Supreme Judicial Court. On September 15, 
1983, the developer filed a Project Notification Form thus triggering the impact review 
process. See MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 10.00. 
46 In 1982, Massachusetts added eight sites to the national" Superfund" priority list of 
hazardous waste sites which have been determined to present a risk or danger to health and 
the environment due to the release or threatened release of hazardous materials. See 42 
U.S.C. § 9605(8)(A). At the end of the Survey year, Massachusetts had a total of 12 sites on 
the priority list, which are eligible for federal cleanup funds. 
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within the Commonwealth and the nation with more modern, safely 
operated facilities, local resistance to siting new hazardous waste facilities 
unfortunately can be expected to remain high. 
§ 10.2. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act - Permits for Placement of 
Solid Fill- Judicial Review. During the Survey year in Hough v. Marsh! 
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed 
and set aside a decision of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the 
"Corps") to issue a permit for the placement of fill in navigable waters 
subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Corps. 2 The permit, which had 
been issued under section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,3 
authorized the placement of 6,500 cubic yards of landfill on an approxi-
mately one-quarter acre tract of coastal wetlands abutting Edgartown Har-
bor on Martha's Vineyard. 4 Following the completion of five years of 
local, state and federal permit proceedings, the permit was challenged in 
1981 in the district court by ten residents of Edgartown.s The district 
court's decision contains a useful summary ofthe important, but generally 
little-understood, administrative process and criteria under which the 
Corps reviews applications to place dredged or fill materials into "naviga-
ble waters" of the United States. 6 In addition, this decision clearly ex-
plains what significant protections are afforded to wetlands subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Corps under section 404. 
In February of 1980, private developers representing Harborview Hotel, 
Inc. submitted an application to the Corps for a so-called "404 permit" for 
the placement of fill on a tract in Edgartown.7 Previous to this application 
the Corps had issued a cease and desist order to these same developers 
because they had commenced filling operations in December of 1979 with-
out a Corps permit. 8 After receipt of the application, the Corps issued a 
§ 10.2. 1 557 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1982). 
2 ld. at 88. 
3 33 U.S.C. § 1344. This legislation is commonly called the Clean Water Act. 
4 557 F. Supp. at 76. The permit was issued on June 4, 1981, by the Division Engineer, New 
England Division, Army Corps of Engineers, under authority delegated by the Secretary of 
the Army and the Chief of Engineering by 33 C.F.R. § 325-8. The applicant, Harborview 
Hotel Co., Inc., requested the permit for construction of two homes and a tennis court. 
s 557 F. Supp. at 76. Prior to applying for the Corps 404 permit, applications for local 
building permits had been filed with the Edgartown Board of Selectmen; subdivision plan 
approval had been requested from the Edgartown Planning Board, pursuant to G.L. c. 41, 
§ 81 U; and approval of the project had been sought from the Edgartown Conservation 
Commission, under the Wetlands Protection Act, G.L. c. 131, § 40. 557 F. Supp. at 76-77. 
6 Navigable waters are defined in § 502(7) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U .S.C. § 1362 (7), to 
be "the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." By regulation the Corps 
has defined "waters of the United States" to include five specific classes of waters, one of 
which includes coastal waters and their adjacent wetlands. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a). 
7 557 F. Supp. at 77. 
8 ld. 
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public notice inviting public comment on the permit application.9 The 
opportunity for public comment allowed the community to assist in an 
evaluation of the proposal, "including whether the unauthorized work 
should be allowed to remain."lo In response to the public notice, 259 
written objections to the project and one letter of support were received 
by the COrpS.l1 In addition, the Corps received comments from the three 
federal agencies responsible for commenting on 404 permit applications. 12 
The Corps then decided it was not necessary for it to hold a public hearing, 
on the grounds that "it would not contribute anything of substance to the 
decision making process." 13 Thereafter, upon consideration of the public 
and agency comments, a review of the Corps field reports, and a review of 
the transcript of the adjudicatory hearing before the Massachusetts De-
partment of Environmental Quality Engineering ("DEQE"),14 the Corps 
decided to issue the permit, concluding that it was in the public interest to 
issue the permit and that the project's unfavorable impacts were insig-
nificant. 15 
Plaintiffs then filed a complaint in federal district court l6 against the 
Secretary of the Army, the Division Engineer of the Corps who issued the 
permit, the Building Inspector of the Town of Edgartown, and the two 
private developers and their corporate entity, Harborview Hotel, Inc. 17 In 
this complaint, plaintiffs sought judicial review ofthe Corps' decision under 
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),18 contending that the permit 
was issued in violation of the Clean Water Act, 19 the National En vironmen-
9 Public Notice dated April 10, 1980, No. NEOOJ).R-25-8(}'045-C. This public notice was 
issued pursuant to 33 C.F.R. § 325.3. 
[0 557 F. Supp. at 77. 
[[ Id. 
12 Id. The Environmental Protection Agency is given general supervision over issuance of 
all 404 permits by section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. Permits issued 
under section 404 are also subject to the requirements of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination 
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666(c). Accordingly, the Corps must consult with the Fish and 
Wildlife Service prior to issuance of 404 permits. This same act requires that the Corps also 
consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service as to water resource development 
projects affecting migratory fish species. See Reorganization Plan No.4 of 1970, 35 Fed. 
Reg. 15,627 (1970). 
13 557 F. Supp. at 77. Reference may be made to the Corps' "Determination of the Need 
for a Public Hearing," dated October 27, 1980, at p. 2. 
[4 This hearing was held by DEQE under the Wetlands Protection Act, O.L. c. 131, § 40, 
on an appeal from the decision of the Edgartown Conservation Commission. 
[S 557 F. Supp. at 77. Reference may be made to the Corps' "Findings of Fact," dated 
May 6, 1981. 
[6 Civil Action No. 81-1822-N (July 20, 1981). 
[7 557 F. Supp. at 77. 
[8 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. 
[9 33 U.S.C. § 1344. 
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tal Policy Act of 1969,20 and the National Historic Preservation Act of 
1966.21 In addition plaintiffs challenged the decision of the local building 
inspector to issue the necessary building permits.n After plaintiffs moved 
unsuccessfully for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the private developers 
from taking any further action pursuant to the 404 permit or the building 
permit and to require them to remove all material previously discharged on 
the project site,23 the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On 
November 19, 1982, the district court issued its Memorandum and Order 
allowing plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, denying defendants' 
motion, and remanding the case to the Corps for further hearings. 24 
In its decision to set aside the 404 permit, the district court took the 
unusual step of reversing its own earlier preliminary review of the merits. 
When the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, it 
concluded that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits. 25 
Upon reexamination, however, the court determined that the Corps had 
totally misapplied a number of its own as well as relevant Environmental 
Protection Agency ("EPA") criteria for the issuance of 404 permits involv-
ing placement of fill in wetlands. 26 The case was remanded back to the 
Corps to consider five specific issues.27 
Before discussing the substantive law, the district court disposed of a 
preliminary issue concerning the jurisdiction of the court to review the 
Corps decision. 28 The court rejected the defendants' contention that re-
view of the Corps decision under the APA was unavailable, and that review 
should be limited to the citizen-suit provision of section 505 of the Clean 
Water Act. 29 Relying principally upon the saving clause in section 505 
20 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. 
21 15 U.S.C. § 470 et seq. 
22 557 F. Supp. at 77. 
23 In considering the motion for a preliminary injunction the district court in essence 
found that the proposed filling would not cause irreparable harm to the local ecosystem and 
that plaintiffs' contentions as to violations of various laws were not meritorious. (Memoran-
dum and Order, January 23,1982). An appeal of this decision was dismissed after the issues 
were briefed, but prior to oral argument, in November 1982 after the district court's decision 
in favor of the plaintiffs on summary judgment. 
24 557 F. Supp. at 88. An appeal of this order was taken by the private defendants, but not 
the Corps, on January 17, 1983. 
25 See supra note 23. 
26 See infra notes 40-57 and accompanying text. 
27 557 F. Supp. at 88. The Court found it unnecessary to make an independent examina-
tion of the claim that the federal defendants had failed, as required by § 102(2)(E) of the 
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E), to consider alternative C<;lUrses 
of action from the action proposed by the agency, concluding that the requirement in the 
agency regulation is at least or more demanding than the NEPA requirement. 557 F. Supp. at 
84 n.3. 
28 557 F. Supp. at 77-79. 
29 33 U .S.C. § 1365. Plaintiffs had failc;d to provide the necessary 60 days notice of intent 
to sue. See 557 F. Supp. at 78. 
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itselPO as well as the grant of federal-question jurisdiction,3! the court 
concluded that review of the Corps decision was proper under the familiar 
APA standard of either "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
othelWise not in accordance with law" or "without observance of proce-
dure required by law."32 
Next the district court reviewed the plaintiffs' contention that the 
failure of the Corps to conduct a public hearing was itself an abuse of 
discretion. 33 The court identified several factors which indicated the de-
sirability of a public hearing. 34 The court found: it was arguable that one 
citizen had met the threshold burden under a Corps regulation35 by 
asserting a specific factual issue requiring a hearing; the project was 
controversial as evidenced by "considerable public opposition" and 
negative recommendations of two federal agencies; the prior DEQE ad-
judicatory hearing was of limited applicability;36 and the legislative his-
tory indicated a strong Congressional desire for public participationY 
The court nevertheless concluded that the agency had considerable dis-
cretion in this area. 38 Accordingly, without deciding whether the failure to 
conduct a public hearing standing alone would be cause for reversal, the 
court suggested that the Corps hold a public hearing upon remand to it of 
the other matters requiring further proceedings.39 
The heart of the court's decision is its analysis of the Corps' com-
pliance with the relevant 404 permit criteria. The Clean Water Act itself 
does not set forth any substantive criteria which must be met for the 
issuance of 404 permits. Instead, the 404 permit process is governed 
simultaneously by permit criteria contained in various regulations of the 
30 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e). 
31 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). 
32 557 F. Supp. at 78-79. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D); see also Citizens to Preserve 
Overtol} Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
33 557 F. Supp. at 79-80. 
34 Id. 
'35 33 C.F.R. § 327.4. The Clean Water Act at 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) contains the more 
general standard that the Corps must provide "notice and opportunity for public hearings" 
prior to issuance of a 404 permit. 
36 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. The court referred to the fact that the scope 
of the Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act, G.L. c. 131, § 40, is less expansive than the 
protection offered by section 404 of the Clean Water Act. 557 F. Supp. at 80. 
37 The district court quoted from CostIe v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198,215 
(1980), and the Sea Coast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 879 (1st CiL), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978). 557 F. Supp. at 80. 
38 557 F. Supp. at 80. 
39 Id. 
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Corps40 and in guidelines of the EPA.41 Part 320 of the Corps regulations 
sets forth the general regulatory policies for evaluating all Department of 
the Army permits. These regulations state twelve "general policies for 
evaluating permit applications," which include: a "public interest re-
view" requiring balancing of the relevant public interest benefits against 
reasonably forseeable detriments ;42 the consideration of the effects ofthe 
project on wetlands;43 the evaluation ofthe impacts on fish and wildlife,44 
water quality standards,45 and historic, scenic, and recreational values;46 
and consideration of other federal, state, and local requirements. 47 The 
EP A guidelines for evaluation of 404 permit applications state a general 
presumption against discharge of dredged or fill material into the aquatic 
ecosystem.48 The guidelines further provide that wetlands merit special 
protection49 and that wetlands, along with other "special sites," generally 
cannot be used for the discharge of fill material where the activity pro-
posed does not require proximity to the aquatic site, absent a demonstra-
tion that practicable alternatives do not exist. 50 
Upon a careful scrutiny of the Corps administrative record to determine 
40 In 1977 the Corps adopted a series of regulations, 33 C.F.R. pts. 320-29, which govern 
all of its permit programs. In addition to 404 permits, the Corps issues permits for dams and 
dikes in navigable waters of the United States, for structures or work in or affecting 
navigable waters of the United States, and for ocean dumping of dredged material. Permits 
under section 404 are subject to the general regulatory policies of Part 320; the particular 
provisions of Part 323; the administrative, enforcement, and public hearing provisions of 
Parts 325-27; and the navigable waters definition of Part 329. For some 1982 revisions ofthe 
Corps' permit regulations which are not discussed herein, see 47 Fed. Reg. 31,794 (July 22, 
1982). 
41 40 C.F.R. pt. 230. The term "guidelines" is a misnomer, since observance of the EPA 
criteria for issuance of permits is required by section 404(b) of the Clean Water Act. See also 
the Corps' own regulations, 33 C.F.R. § 320.2(a). Where the EPA guidelines alone would 
prohibit issuance of a 404 permit, the Corps can only override these guidelines on the basis 
of the economic impact that permit denial would have on navigation and anchorage. 33 
U.S.C. § 1344(b)(2). 
42 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a). This regulation requires consideration of all relevant factors that 
may affect the public interest and provides that "no permit will be granted unless its 
issuance is found to be in the public interest." 
43 Id. at § 320.4(b). This regulation spells out in some detail the reasons why wetlands are 
important to the public interest and why unnecessary alteration or destruction of wetlands 
should be discouraged. This regulation does not, however, preclude issuance of permits 
requiring alteration or destruction of wetlands. 
44 ld. at § 320.4(c). 
45 Id. at § 320.4(d). 
46 ld. at § 320.4(e). 
47 Id. at § 320.4(j). 
48 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.1(c), (d). 
49 ld. at §§ 230.1(d), 230.3(q-I), 230.41. 
50 Id. at § 320.10(a). This regulation presumes that practicable alternatives do exist which 
do not require placement of fill in wetlands for activities which are not water dependent. I d. 
at § 230.1O(a)(3). The regulation places the burden on the applicant to demonstrate the 
absence of a practicable alternative. Id. 
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whether the Corps had considered the relevant factors,51 the district court 
concluded that the applicant had not carried its burden of clearly demon-
strating the absence of any practicable alternatives to the use of wetlands 
for the construction of two private dwellings, a non-water-dependent 
project requiring "a more persuasive showing than otherwise concerning 
the lack of alternatives. "52 What the record showed in this regard, the 
court observed, was that the applicant's entire efforts to demonstrate lack 
of practicable alternatives consisted of one letter from a local realtor, 
written more than fourteen months prior to the Corps decision, stating 
that there was only one alternative parcel "in the prime residential and 
central area of Edgartown. "53 The court found that nothing in the record 
showed this letter remained an accurate depiction of the real estate 
market up until the time of the Corps decision, that no inquiry had been 
made outside of the "prime residential area," that there was no showing 
why the dwellings had to be constructed adjacent to each other, and that 
the Corps determination that the one alternative parcel's cost was too 
expensive misconstrued the definition of "practicable" in the EPA guide-
lines. 54 
The district court also found it necessary to remand several other issues 
to the Corps for a further consideration under the Clean Water Act criteria, 
namely: the necessity for the developers to resubmit their application for 
subdivision approval to the local planning board, based upon Edgartown's 
withdrawal from the Martha's Vineyard Commission; compliance with 
Edgartown's zoning by-laws and a land use regulation of the Commission; 
consideration of the project's adverse economic effects, particularly in 
regard to elimination of the Edgartown lighthouse as a tourist attraction; 
and consideration of the cumulative effects of this project and other exist-
ing and anticipated projects.55 In addition, the court found that the Corps 
had not satisfied its affirmative obligation to determine if grant of the permit 
would have an adverse effect upon the eligibility of the Edgartown light-
house for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places.56 Finally, 
the court stated that the Corps should not have passively relied upon the 
absence of an official determination from the relevant federal and state 
agencies. 57 
51 The Court recognized, however, that its function was not to substitute its judgment for 
that of the Corps. 557 F. Supp. at 83 (citing Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); 
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980); 
Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1045 (1st Cir. 1982); 
Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1071-72 (1st Cir. 1980)). 
52 Id. at 83-84. See especially the EPA guidelines at 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3). 
53 557 F. Supp. at 83-84. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 84-86. 
56Id. 
57 Id. 
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This decision clearly shows that courts are willing to step in and make a 
careful examination of the details of how the Corps has applied the relevant 
404 permit criteria, especially where adequate facts are presented to sug-
gest that the Corps has failed to follow the requirements of its own regula-
tions. The decision also suggests that once the criteria have been correctly 
applied, the courts will be unwilling, absent extraordinary circumstances, to 
substitute their judgment for that of the responsible agencies. 
§ 10.3. Wetlands Regulation. The Survey year included a major change 
in the state wetlands protection program. On November 9, 1982, the 
Department of Environmental Quality Engineering ("DEQE") promul-
gated a new set of regulations! for administering the Massachusetts Wet-
lands Protection Act. 2 The new regulations clarify the program's jurisdic-
tion and procedures of the program and set forth new substantive stan-
dards for projects in inland wetlands. The effective date of the new 
regulations was delayed until April 1, 1983, presumably to give the public 
and the local conservation commissions, which administer the program, 
adequate time to familiarize themselves with the new requirements. Ac-
cordingly, any application, referred to as a Notice of Intent, filed before 
§ 10.3. I The new regulations are entitled "Revisions to the Existing Wetlands Protection 
Act Regulations." MAss. ADMIN. CODE tit. 310, § 10.00. 
2 G.L. c. 131, § 40. Massachusetts has a long history of strict wetlands protection 
commencing in 1963 with the Jones Act (chapter 426 of the Acts of 1963), which regulated 
development of coastal wetlands, and in 1965 with the Hatch Act (ch~pter 220 of the Acts of 
1%5), which regulated inland wetlands. The wetlands protection program requires the filing 
of a Notic~ of Intent before any removal, filling, dredging or altering of wetland areas. The 
Notice is filed with the local conservation commission which then must hold a public hearing 
within 21 days of filing of the Notice and issue an Order of Conditions within 21 days of 
holding the hearing. The Order of Conditions sets forth the performance standards for the 
project. The Order can be a flat denial of the project. Although the Supreme Judicial Court 
has not directly reviewed this issue, authority for the power to deny any filing can be found 
in Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe and Co., 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 
(1%5); John Donnelly and Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Board, 369 Mass. 206, 339 
N.E.2d 709 (1975); Lovequist v. Conservation Commission of the Town of Dennis, 379 
Mass. 7, 393 N.E.2d 858 (1979). Appeals of local decisions are permitted to DEQE. 
The above described program under the Wetlands Protection Act should not be confused 
with another statewide program of wetland regulation known as the Wetland Restriction 
Program, under the coastal and inland wetland restriction acts, G.L. c. 130, § 105 (coastal) 
and G.L. c. 131, § 40A (inland). In 1983, the restriction program was moved from the 
Department of Environmental Management to DEQE. The state is authorized to adopt 
restriction orders on a town-by-town basis, prohibiting any dredging, filling or altering of a 
wetland, with certain exceptions for construction of utilities, roadways, beaches, foot-
bridges, agricultural improvements and drainage ditches. See MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 302, 
§§ 4.00 (coastal program), 6.00 (inland program). In the case of Moskow v. Commissioner of 
the Department of Environmental Management, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2134,427 N.E.2d 750, 
the Supreme Judicial Court upheld an inland wetland restriction order in the City of 
Newton, finding that the order did not constitute a taking, 
16
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April 1, 1983 is governed by the old regulations. In addition, any Exten-
sion of an Order of Conditions for which the Notice of Intent was filed 
before April 1 likewise is governed by the old regulations. 
The new regulations are divided into three parts. Part I, "Regulations 
for All Wetlands," sets forth the jurisdiction of the program, the defini-
tions and procedures for filing applications, review thereof, and appeals. 
Part II, entitled" Additional Regulations for Coastal Wetlands," recod-
ifies without change existing regulations for coastal wetlands. Part Ill, 
entitled" Additional Regulations for Inland Wetlands," sets forth new 
substantive performance standards for reviewing and regulating activities 
in inland wetlands. Part III is patterned after Part II, the coastal regula-
tions. 
The new regulations clarify the jurisdiction of the program. Under the 
old regulations, the jurisdiction included activities3 in certain statutorily 
enumerated resource areas, such as banks, fresh water or coastal wet-
lands, beaches and swamps,4 which bordered on certain specified water 
bodies, namely, estuaries, creeks, rivers, streams, ponds, lakes or the 
ocean. The jurisdiction of conservation commissions and DEQE also 
included a 100 foot buffer strip measured from the resource area, which 
received inconsistent interpretation and lead to confusion as to the scope 
ofihe program. The new regulations continue to include any development 
in a resource area which borders on an enumerated water body as well as 
land under any of the enumerated water bodies, and land subject to tidal 
action, coastal storm flowage or flooding. Such resource areas now are 
called Areas Subject to Protection. 5 The location of the buffer zone is 
clarified by a more precise definition. The new regulations define a buffer 
zone of 100 feet horizontally from an Area Subject to Protection. 6 Ac-
tivities in the buffer zone, however, are not automatically included. In-
stead, an applicant submits a Request for Determination of Applicability. 7 
The Conservation Commission then decides whether the activity will alter 
an Area Subject to Protection. If the Conservation Commission makes an 
affirmative determination, a Notice of Intent will be required. If a Nega-
3 The following types of activities are enumerated in the statute: "remove, fill, dredge or 
alter." G.L. c. 131, § 40. The term "alter" is broadly defined under the new and old 
regulations. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 310, §§ 10.04 (new regulations), 10.02(3) (old regula-
tions). 
4 The complete list of resource areas is stated in the Wetland Protection Act as follows: 
bank, fresh water wetland, coastal wetland, beach, dune, flat, marsh, meadow or swamp. 
G.L. c. 131, § 40. 
5 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 310, § 10.02(1). 
6 /d. at § 1O.02(2)(b). 
7 In the alternative, the applicant can choose to dispense with the jurisdictional inquiry 
and file a Notice of Intent immediately. The new regulations contain new forms for these 
filings, including an abbreviated Notice of Intent. 
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tive Determination is reached, no further filing or regulation ofthe project 
under the wetland program is required. Areas outside of the buffer zone 
are not included unless and until the activity actually alters an Area 
Subject to Protection. 8 
For each type of Area Subject to Protection, Part III of the new 
regulations sets fOlth presumptions of significance which guide conserva-
tion commissions and DEQE in determining how the resource area pro-
tects the interests identified in the Wetland Protection Act. 9 The presump-
tions can be overcome by showing that the resource area in a particular 
case functions atypically. In addition, performance standards are set for 
activities in each type of wetland resource area. The standards are to be 
used by conservation commissions in drafting Orders of Conditions once 
the area has been determined to be significant to an interest(s) to be 
protected. 
The new regulations single out for more strict protection wetland re-
source areas called bordering vegetated wetlands, which include wet 
meadows, marshes, swamps and bogs. The type of activities which can be 
performed in bordering vegetated wetlands is strictly limited. Bordering 
vegetative wetlands are defined as fresh-water wetlands which border on 
creeks, rivers, streams, ponds and lakes. The boundary line of a bordering 
vegetated wetland is defined by the extent of wetland plant species. If 50% 
or more of the vegetation community consists of these wetland plant species, 
then the area is included. With minor exceptions, under the strict perfor-
mance standard for bordering vegetated wetlands a project cannot destroy 
or otherwise impair the area.!O Part III of the regulations contains a list of 
"limited projects" that may go forward at the discretion of the conserva-
tion commission even if they do not meet the strict performance stan-
dards. These include such projects as utility construction, new agricul-
tural projects and roadway construction where there is no alternative 
means to reach otherwise developable upland areas. 
An Order of Conditions is now effective for three years, and up to five 
years under special circumstances.!! An Extension may be issued for up 
8 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 310, § 10.02(2)(c). 
9 The interests to be protected are set forth in statute as follows: public and private water 
supply, ground water supply, flood control, storm damage prevention, prevention of pollu-
tion, protection of land containing shellfish, protection of fisheries. O.L. c. 131, § 40. 
10 An exception is made for (1) the loss of 5,000 square feet of Bordering Vegetated 
Wetland when said area is replaced or (2) the loss of 500 square feet of linear "finger-like" 
areas. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 310, § 10.94(b) and (c). In addition, if the applicant can show 
that the bordering vegetative wetland is not significant to protection of the interests specified 
to be protected under section 10.55(1) of these regulations, the work will be allowed and a 
Determination of Non-Significance is issued by the Conservation Commission. 
11 /d. at § 10.05(6)(d). 
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to three years. 12 Formerly Orders and Extensions were effective for only 
one year periods. 
The new regulations also clarify time periods under the statute. Time 
periods of ten days or less are measured by business days and time 
periods of more than ten days are measured by calendar days.13 Hence, 
the ten-day time period allowed for appealing an Order of Conditions will 
be calculated using business days only. The date of mailing of an Order of 
Conditions, as opposed to the date ofthe Order, is now defined as the date 
of its issuance. This change is also important for determining how to count 
the ten days for filing an appeal. 14 
The underlying philosophy of the revised regulations, explained in a 
lengthy preamble, is to decrease regulatory control over upland areas. At 
the same time, the new regulations impose stronger controls on develop-
ment in wetland areas. The direction of development in these upland 
areas will hopefully facilitate the increased protection of the important 
wetland resource areas so that the wetlands will remain intact in order to 
perform their natural functions. 
§ 10.4. Department of Environmental Quality Engineering - Air Pol-
lution - Protection of the Public Health. During the Survey year inBrook-
line v. Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Quality Engi-
neering l the Supreme Judicial Court set forth important principles in 
the areas of review of agency regulations and decisions and the state's 
authority to protect the public health. The case arose from an appeal of 
the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering's ("DEQE") ap-
proval of construction of the Medical Area Total Energy Plant, Inc. 
r' MA TEP") in the Mission Hill section of Boston, adjacent to the Town 
of Brookline. 2 Pursuant to DEQE air pollution regulations,3 MATEP 
submitted an application to DEQE for preconstruction approval to build a 
co-generation facility which would generate steam, chilled water and 
electricity for hospitals, educational and research institutions, and the 
Mission Park housing complex in Boston through power produced by six 
diesel engine generators.4 DEQE held a series of adjudicatory hearings on 
the application and initially issued two decisions; the first approved the 
steam and chilled water portion of the system while the second disap-
12 /d. at § 1O.05(8)(a). An Extension may be denied where no work has begun on the 
project except in the case of unavoidable delay. ld. at § 1O.05(8)(b)(I). 
13 /d. at § 10.05(1). 
14 ld. at §§ 10.04, 1O.05(7)(c). 
§ 10.4. 1 387 Mass. 372, 439 N.E.2d 792 (1982). 
1 Petitions for judicial review were filed in superior court pursuant to G.L. c. 30A, § 14. 
3 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 310, § 7.02(2). 
4 387 Mass. at 374-75, 439 N.E.2d at 797. 
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proved the six diesel engine generators. s Revised plans were later submit-
ted by MATEp6 and, after a rehearing, DEQE approved the diesel en-
gines subject to certain conditions to protect the public health. 7 The Town 
of Brookline, a group of residents of Brookline and a resident of Mission 
Hill brought suit, challenging the DEQE decisions approving construc-
tion. 8 MA TEP also initiated a court action, challenging the initial denial of 
the diesel engines and the subsquent limitations of emissions and operat-
ing conditions of the later approval. 9 The superior court judge consoli-
dated the cases and reported them to the Appeals Court, and the Supreme 
Judicial Court granted the parties application for direct appellate re-
view. lo 
The Court affirmed DEQE's decisions, deferring to the agency's exper-
tise, but remanded the case to DEQE for a determination of the potential 
adverse health effects of the carcinogenic and mutagenic emissions from 
the facility. II The outcome of the hearing on remand should be of major 
significance because it will probably lead to legal precedents in the un-
chartered areas of the burden of proof and risk analysis in hearings 
concerning potential health effects. 
On MATEP's challenges to the decisions, the Court found, inter alia, 
that the DEQE regulation which did not set specific quantitative levels of 
air pollution emissions but defined air pollution in general nuisance ter-
minology was not unconstitutionally vague, nor did it constitute an abuse 
of discretionY The Court left this determination to DEQE "on a case-by 
case basis in light of the current scientific evidence." 13 The Court upheld 
DEQE's setting a short-term standard for nitrogen dioxide in an ad-
5 Jd. at 375-76, 439 N.E.2d at 797. 
6 /d. at 376, 439 N.E.2d at 797. 
7 The dates of DEQE's three decisions were November 30, 1979, May 27, 1980 and 
November 24, 1980 respectively. 
8 387 Mass. at 374-75, 439 N.E.2d at 796-97. 
9 /d. at 376, 439 N .E.2d at 798. 
10 /d. at 374, 439 N .E.2d at 796-97. 
11 The hearing on these remanded issues commenced on September 12, 1983. 
12 387 Mass. at 376-79, 439 N.E.2d at 798-99. The challenged regulation states: "No 
person owning, leasing, or controlling the operation of any air contamination source shall 
willfully, negligently, or through failure to provide necessary equipment or to take necessary 
precautions, permit any emission from said air contamination source or sources of such 
quantities of air contaminants which will cause, by themselves or in conjunction with other 
air contaminants, a condition of air pollution." MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 310, § 7.01. "Air 
pollution" is defined in the regulations as the presence of air contaminants which would: "a. 
cause a nusiance; b. be injurious, or be on the basis of current information, potentially 
injurious to human or animal life, to vegetation, or to property; or c. unreasonably interfere 
with the comfortable enjoyment of life and property or the conduct of business." /d. at 
§ 7.00 (Definitions). 
13 387 Mass. at 379, 439 N.E.2d at 799. 
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judicatory proceeding, as opposed to a formal rulemaking procedure. 14 
DEQE found that the long-term federal ambient air standard for nitrogen 
dioxide, which was based on an annual average, was not sufficient to 
protect the public health and therefore set an hourly standard for nitrogen 
dioxide. ls The Court also rejected MATEP's argument that chapter 111, 
section 142D of the General Laws does not permit the state to set more 
stringent ambient air standards than the analogous federal standards. 16 
As to the objections to DEQE's decision by the opponents ofthe plant, 
the Court affirmed DEQE except, as related above, on the issue of 
carcinogens. 17 The DEQE hearing officer had found that the issue regard-
ing the possibility of carcinogenic or mutagenic effects were not raised in 
a timely fashion. 18 The Court, after reviewing the various memoranda 
submitted by the opponents, although "not lightly overtum[ing] an ad-
ministrative agency's finding of fact," found that the question was prop-
erly before the agency, and hence remanded the case to DEQE for 
consideration of this issue. 19 As to the other issues raised by the oppo-
nents, the Court upheld DEQE's findings as supported by substantial 
evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. 20 The Court stated that even if it 
disagreed with DEQE's conclusion, it would not disturb it if based on 
sufficient evidence and repeatedly deferred to DEQE's expertise. 21 
§ 10.5. Sewer Connection Permits. Since environmental issues last were 
covered in the Survey, I Massachusetts has instituted a new sewer connec-
tion permit program. Although there were no regulatory changes in the 
permit program during this Survey year, the program's general framework 
warrants some comment. 
Under the Massachusetts Clean Water Act, the Division of Water 
14 Jd. at 379-80, 439 N .E.2d at 799-800. 
15 Diesel engines such as those involved in this case emit oxides of nitrogen (NOx), 
primarily including nitric oxide (NO), which rises in the atmosphere and combines with 
ozone to produce nitrogen dioxide (NO.), a harmful pollutant. Although DEQE and EPA 
have established standards for long-term (yearly) exposure to NO., no standards have been 
set for short-term (hourly) exposures. The Clean Air Act amendments of 1977 required EPA 
to establish a short term NO. standard within one year. While several draft criteria docu-
ments were issued, EPA has not yet formally proposed such a standard. 
16 387 Mass. at 381-82, 439 N .E.2d at 800-01. 
17 ld. at 383-84, 439 N.E.2d at 801-02. See supra note II and accompanying text. 
1" Jd. at 383, 439 N.E.2d at 801. The emissions which might be carcinogenic or mutagenic 
include polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH), polynuclear organic matter (POM) and 
trace metals. 
19 Jd. at 383-84, 439 N.E.2d at 801-02. 
20 See id. at 393, 439 N.E.2d at 807. 
21 See id. at 389, 439 N .E.2d at 805. 
§ 10.5. 1 Environmental law was last covered in the Survey in the 1976 ANN. SURV. 
MASS. LAW §§ 16.1-16.10, at 543-74. 
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Pollution Control ("DWPC") is authorized to issue sewer extension or 
connection permits. 2 The DWPC's current regulations state that a party 
seeking to construct, effect, modify, maintain or use a sewer connection 
or extension must file a permit application with the DWPC.3 Connections 
which will add less than 2,000 gallons of sanitary sewage per day to an 
existing sewer system are exempt from the permit requirement. 4 Also 
exempt are extensions and connections that were already in existence on 
May 10, 1979, the date the regulations were promulgated.s A permit is 
required, however, for any modification, increase in flow, or change in 
use of such a preexisting extension or connection. 6 The regulations re-
quire public notice of all permit applications and public hearings in con-
troversial cases. 7 In instances where a sewer system is overloaded,8 the 
DWPC is authorized to order a ban or restrictions on connections in the 
affected municipality. 9 In sewer ban communities, the DWPC requires the 
municipality to maintain a "sewer bank" whereby up to one gallon of 
sewage can be discharged into the system for every two gallons of inflow 
or infiltration correction. 10 Permits may only be issued when the necesc 
sary repairs are made to correct infiltration or inflow problems. I I Sewer 
connections are also regulated by municipal regulations, federal pre-
treatment standards and, if in the Metropolitan District Commission's 
("MDC") area, the MDC's rules and regulations. 12 
2 G.L. c. 21, § 43(2). 
3 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 314, § 8.02(1). Emergency regulations were promulgated Feb-
ruary 1, 1979 after the decision in Town of Holden v. Division of Water Pollution Control, 6 
Mass. App. Ct. 423, 376 N .E.2d 1259 (1978). 
4 In municipalities where the DWPC has issued a sewer connection ban, however, a permit 
may be required for connections adding less than 2,000 gallons of sanitary sewage per day. 
Sewer connection bans are discussed supra at notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
S MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 314, § 8.03(2). 
6/d. 
7 Jd. at § 8.02(4) and (5). 
8 Overload of the sewer system can be caused by "inflow," which is additional flow from 
storm drainage or cooling water system connections, and by "infiltration," which consists of 
leaks of groundwater into the sewer. 
9 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 314, § 8.03(5) and (6). As of December 31, 1982, partial or total 
sewer bans affected the following municipalities: Ashland, Bridgewater, Cohasset, Dudley, 
Framingham, Holden, Natick, Norwood, Plymouth, Quincy, Revere, Rutland, Shrewsbury, 
Sturbridge, and Westborough. 
10 See supra note 8. 
11/d. 
12 Under the Clean Water Act, the EPA sets pre-treatment standards for industrial wastes 
discharging into a sewer treatment plant. 40 C.F.R. § 403; see also 47 Fed. Reg. 4,518 (1982) 
(deferring the effective date of portions of the general pretreatment regulations); 47 Fed. Reg. 
42,688 (1982) (reinstating the general pretreatment regulations as of March 30,1983). Specific 
treatment standards have been established for certain industrial users. 40 C.F.R. § 405 et seq. 
MDC regulations for industrial wastes are found at MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 350, § 11.00 et 
seq. 
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